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INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 2016 at 2:48 am, CNN’s Wolf Blitzer announced
Donald Trump as the next President of the United States.1 On election day,
November 8, 2016, Donald Trump won the popular elections in a sufficient
number of states such that he emerged with the most pledged presidential
electors, more than the 270 that he would need to defeat his Democratic
opponent, the former Secretary of State and Senator from New York, Hillary Clinton. However, if Peter Chiafalo and his friends had their way, notwithstanding what happened on “election day,” and leaving aside Wolf
Blitzer’s purportedly authoritative pronouncement on CNN, Donald Trump
would not become the 45th President of the United States.
Peter Chiafalo, Levi Guerra and Esther John (the “Chiafalo Electors”)
were three presidential electors from the State of Washington who were
pledged to vote for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election. Most
Americans believed that Donald Trump won the election on “election day,”
November 8, 2016. But as the Chiafalo Electors knew, all that happened on
“election day” was that the states selected their slate of presidential electors.
It is true that the states award their electors to the party that wins the popular vote in the state and thus, as a functional matter, we can predict which
candidate will prevail in the electoral college based upon the results of the
popular returns in each state. Presidential electors are selected on the basis of
* Edward and Ellen Schwarzman Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
** Class of 1950 Herman B. Wells Endowed Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Mauer School of Law. Thanks to Curt Bradley, Michael Morley, Derek Muller, David
Strauss, and Mark Tushnet for extensive and thoughtful comments on this Article and to Neil
Siegel for insightful discussions that improved the Article. Our deepest thanks also extend to
Mandy Boltax for her superb research assistance.
1
See Leinz Vales, The Moment CNN Projected Donald Trump Is President-Elect, CNN
(Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/moment-cnn-projects-trump-u-spresident-cnntv/index.html [https://perma.cc/659Q-WRSV].
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their loyalty to their party. But this was only a prediction. Nothing official
had yet happened. The only presidential selection process that officially
counts under the American Constitution is the meeting of the presidential
electors, those selected on November 8, in their respective states to cast their
electoral ballots. In the presidential election of 2016, that day, the day in
which the presidential electors were required by law to meet and cast their
ballots in their respective “electoral colleges,” was December 19, 2016.2
Chiafalo was a co-founder of the “Hamilton Electors,”3 a group of presidential electors who derived their inspiration from Alexander Hamilton’s
vision of the Electoral College. In Federalist 68, Hamilton painted a picture
of presidential electors as judicious and independent thinkers entrusted with
the grave task of choosing the person who would be the best President for
the country.4 The Hamilton Electors believed that the Constitution authorized them, as presidential electors, to vote for whomever they pleased. They
did not believe that their discretion could be constrained by law, state or
federal. Specifically, the Hamilton Electors hoped to deprive Trump of the
presidency by persuading their fellow presidential electors, both those
pledged to Trump and those pledged to Clinton, to vote on December 19
for a compromise candidate, someone other than Donald Trump or Hillary
Clinton. At the very least, they hoped to deprive Trump of an Electoral
College majority, which would then force the House of Representatives to
choose the country’s next President and Vice President.
The Chiafalo Electors faced a legal problem. Under the laws of the
State of Washington, each elector nominee is required to pledge that if she is
selected for the position, she agrees to serve and “to mark my ballots for
president and vice-president for the nominees for those offices of the party
that nominated me.”5 Moreover, in order for an elector’s vote to be valid, the
elector must cast her vote consistent with her pledge.6 That is, the elector
must vote for her party’s nominee. Otherwise, her vote would not be
counted. Under Washington law as amended in 2019, an elector who casts
an invalid ballot—by not voting for the nominee of her party—is automatically removed as an elector. In the language of the Washington statute, the
elector “vacates the office of elector, creating a vacant position to be filled” by
the secretary of state as provided for by law. In 2016, before Washington

2

3 U.S.C. § 7 (2020) provides: “The electors of President and Vice President of each
State shall meet and give their votes on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in
December next following their appointment at such place in each State as the legislature of
such State shall direct.” Id.
3
See ROBERT M. ALEXANDER, REPRESENTATION AND THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 163
(2019).
4
THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 2001).
5
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.56.084 (2019) (West, Westlaw through all legislation
from the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.).
6
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.56.090 (2019) (West, Westlaw through all legislation from the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.).
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amended the law, an elector who filed an invalid ballot was subject to a civil
fine up to $1,000.7
Because they refused to vote consistent with their pledge, the Chiafalo
Electors were fined by Washington’s secretary of state. They unsuccessfully
appealed their fines through the state courts.8 In its decision upholding the
fines, the Washington Supreme Court stated that Article II, Section I “gives
to the states absolute authority in the manner of appointing electors.”9 This
authority also includes the power to fine electors who vote in a manner that
is contrary to the dictates of the state. The Chiafalo Electors filed a petition
for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court asking the Court to review
their case.
The Chiafalo Electors were not alone. In Colorado, Michael Baca,
Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich (the “Baca Electors”) were presidential
electors selected by the Democratic Party. As Democrats, they pledged to
vote for Hilary Clinton, who won the state’s popular vote. Under Colorado
law, presidential electors are required to cast their ballots for the winner of
the State’s popular vote. Therefore, the Baca Electors were required by Colorado law to cast their presidential electoral votes for Clinton.
However, dismayed by the prospect of a Trump presidency, Michael
Baca— the other co-founder of the Hamilton Electors10—sought to convince a sufficient number of presidential electors, pledged Democrats as well
as Republicans, to vote for an alternative candidate. Republican John Kasich
was the suggested option.11 Thus, instead of voting for Clinton at the December 19th meeting of the state’s electoral college as he pledged and as
required by state law, Baca voted for Kasich.12 As a consequence, Colorado’s
Secretary of State removed Baca as an elector and discarded his vote. After
seeing what happened to Michael Baca, Polly Baca and Robert Nemanich
decided to vote for Clinton, though they too would have preferred to vote
for Kasich.
The Baca Electors sued.13 The district court dismissed the lawsuit on
standing grounds and, alternatively, on the ground that the plaintiffs failed
to state a claim. A panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed. In direct contrast to
the Supreme Court of Washington, the Tenth Circuit held that Article II
guaranteed the right of presidential electors to vote as they saw fit. The
Court explained, “while the Constitution grants the states plenary power to
appoint their electors, it does not provide the states the power to interfere
7

See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2332 (2020).
See id. at 2318.
9
In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 814 (Wash. 2019).
10
See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 163.
11
See Lilly O’Donnell, Meet the ‘Hamilton Electors’ Hoping for an Electoral College Revolt,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/meet-thehamilton-electors-hoping-for-an-electoral-college-revolt/508433/ [https://perma.cc/GD6PD8GU].
12
See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 901 (10th Cir. 2019).
13
See id. The State prevailed in the district court on the ground that the plaintiffs did not
have standing and that they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A panel of
the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision in part and affirmed in part.
8
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once voting begins, to remove an elector . . . or to appoint an elector to cast a
replacement vote.” Colorado appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari to resolve the dispute between the courts.
In Chiafalo v. Washington, Justice Kagan authored an opinion for the
Court upholding a state’s power to compel electors, under pains of penalty—
fines or removal—to vote as instructed by the state.14 Justice Kagan offered
two bases for her decision. First, she relied on the text of the Constitution.
She argued that Article II, Section 1, which authorizes the states to appoint
presidential electors “in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,”
provides the states wide latitude to condition the appointment of presidential
electors on any basis not excluded by the Constitution. And because the
Constitution does not preclude the states from eliminating the discretion of
presidential electors, states can require presidential electors to vote for their
party’s nominee when that person prevails in the popular vote.
Second, Justice Kagan, more subtly—and we will argue more consequentially—relied upon past historical practice to support her conclusion
that the Constitution authorizes states to not only require electors to take an
oath to support their party’s nominee but also to sanction electors who
breach their oath. Justice Kagan explained that elector discretion had not
been part of our historical practice.15 To the contrary, states have long sought
to bind electors. “From the first,” she pointed out, “States sent them to the
Electoral College—as today Washington does—to vote for pre-selected candidates, rather than to use their own judgment.” And electors, she intimated,
have generally acquiesced to this loss of discretion.16 Since almost immediately after the Founding, electors have functioned as “agents of others.” The
laws of Washington and Colorado simply “follow[ ] in the same tradition.”
Justice Kagan thus concluded for the Court in Chiafalo: “The Electors’ constitutional claim has neither text nor history on its side.” In a companion
case, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, the Court issued a per curiam
opinion based upon its decision in Chiafalo, which had the effect of reversing
the Tenth Circuit and upholding Colorado’s law.
Surprisingly, not a single Justice disagreed with Justice Kagan’s deployment of historical gloss in Chiafalo. In fact, with the exception of Justice
Thomas, who concurred in the judgment but would have decided the case
on Tenth Amendment as opposed to Article II grounds, every member of
the Court concurred in Justice Kagan’s reasoning. And quite frankly, the
disagreement between Justices Thomas and Kagan was quite narrow. Moreover, the outcome seemed popular among legal elites and among the public
at large. For example, according to an analysis by the notable website

14

140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020).
See id. at 2326 (“Electors have only rarely exercised discretion in casting their ballots for
President . . . .”).
16
See id. (“And electors (or at any rate, almost all of them) rapidly settled into that nondiscretionary role.”).
15

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\15-1\HLP107.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 5

Constitutionalizing Historical Gloss

14-JUL-21

12:17

19

Fivethirtyeight.com, over 60% of Americans approved of the outcome in
Chiafalo.17
Though Chiafalo looks like an easy case, the issue presented—whether
presidential electors have a constitutional right to cast their ballots for
whomever they want—is much more difficult than Justice Kagan’s opinion
lets on. Chiafalo is part of a recent trend of Supreme Court decisions that
rely upon the post-Founding historical practices of constitutional actors to
give meaning to the Constitution.18 This method of constitutional interpretation, which some scholars have called “historical gloss,”19 and others refer
to as convention,20 has also given rise to a growing and robust academic
literature primarily focused on the conditions under which it is justifiable, if
ever, for courts to use historical gloss as a modality of constitutional interpretation.21 The literature has largely been driven by disputes in the domain of
separation of powers—focused on the legitimacy and illegitimacy of deploying “gloss” to resolve constitutional disagreement among the three
branches of the federal government—though scholars have extended their
inquiry to other areas as well.22 Justice Kagan in Chiafalo deploys historical
gloss to give constitutional meaning in a context that has received little attention in the historical gloss literature, the law of democracy. This Article
uses Chiafalo to examine the deployment of historical gloss in that context.
We make one central point in this Article. Justice Kagan’s opinion in
Chiafalo uses historical gloss to entrench a particular and modern view of
political participation—which is best reflected by American political practices—by rejecting an alternative and anachronistic view—which is best reflected by the text and structure of the Constitution. Part I argues that
Chiafalo is not a textualist opinion because Article II, Section 1 does not
support the majority’s conclusion that states have the power to limit elector
discretion. The majority’s reasoning to the contrary is not persuasive, even
on its own terms. Part II argues that Chiafalo is best understood as the latest
case from the Court to apply the approach of “historical gloss” to interpret17
See Amelia Thompson-DeVeaux & Anna Wiederkehr, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 13,
2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-courts-big-rulings-were-surprisinglymainstream-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/Q86K-TMW2].
18
See, e.g., Noel Canning v. NLRB, 573 U.S. 513 (2014); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 60
(2017).
19
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417 (2012).
20
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Trevor Morrison, Constitution by Convention, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1913 (2020). As Issacharoff & Morrison explain, “beneath the Constitution’s text
there lises a world of institutional settlement—a constitution by convention.” Id. at 1916.
21
See, e.g., id.; Joseph Blocher & Margaret Lemos, Practice and Precedent in Historical Gloss
Games, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1 (2016); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss,
Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1 (2020); Curtis A.
Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255 (2017); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess:
Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT.
REV. 1 (2014).
22
See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Fourth Amendment Gloss, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 701 (2019).
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ing the Constitution. However, unlike past cases where the Court has used
gloss to interpret the Constitution when the text is ambiguous or silent, in
Chiafalo, Justice Kagan deploys historical practice in the face of a clear constitutional text which leads to a different conclusion than the evidence from
historical practice. Part III examines why Justice Kagan relies on gloss in
Chiafalo and explains, from the vantage point of law and democracy, that the
Court deploys gloss instrumentally to constitutionalize a particular view of
political participation and representation. Chiafalo updates and modernizes
our understanding of representation and political participation. Chiafalo is
thus as much about the future as it is the past. It is about entrenching a
different conception of democratic politics. Part IV explores some problems
that are raised for the historical gloss literature when gloss is used in this way
to interpret the Constitution. Finally, we conclude with some questions
about the robustness and potential of the Court’s right of political
participation.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT: INTERPRETING ARTICLE II, SECTION 1
In this Part, we address the central question presented in Chiafalo,
which is how to interpret Article II, Section 1’s appointment power. The
question is specifically whether that clause authorizes a state to penalize an
elector who votes in a manner that is inconsistent with the state’s instructions. There are three obvious possibilities for interpreting Article II, Section
1. The first option is that Article II, Section 1 protects elector discretion.
This was the position of the Tenth Circuit in Baca. The second option is
that the constitutional text is silent and does not address the issue. This is
the position of Justice Thomas in Chiafalo. The third option is that the text
authorizes the state to penalize electors. This is the position that the majority in Chiafalo purports to support. As we show in this Part, of all three
options, the least convincing one is the argument that the text of the Constitution authorizes the state to remove elector discretion.
Agreeing on a method for choosing the chief executive was no easy task
for the delegates gathered in Philadelphia in 1787.23 The delegates entertained a number of proposals, including election by popular vote, selection
by the Governors of the States, selection by Congress, and selection by electors chosen by popular election.24 Toward the end of the Convention, on
September 4, three months after James Wilson suggested selecting the presi23
Reflecting on the constitutional convention, James Wilson recalled, “The convention
sir, were perplexed with no part of this plan so much as with the mode of choosing the President of the United States.” Convention of Pennsylvania, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 415, 511 (Jonathan Elliot ed., reprint ed. 1987) (statement of James Wilson).
24
See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel Charles, The Electoral College, the Right to Vote,
and Our Federalism: A Comment on a Lasting Institution, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 879, 880
(2002).
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dent using electors, the Committee of Eleven proposed a compromise.25 Article II, Section 1, clauses 2, 3, and 4 memorializes a process of presidential
selection that we now refer to colloquially as the Electoral College.26
Though the language of the Constitution is often broad and often indeterminate,27 the same is not true of the Electoral College. The constitutional
text that sets up the presidential selection process is directive, specific, and
determinate. Article II, Section 1, clause 2 provides a formula—reflecting
the structural compromise between the large and small states—for allocating
presidential electors. Under this formula, each state is entitled to the same
number of electors as they are entitled to representatives in Congress. Reflecting the federalist structure of the Constitution, Article II, section 1,
clause 2 instructs specifically that the state legislatures decide how to appoint
presidential electors, but section 1, clause 4 states that Congress determines
the time of choosing the electors and the day that the electors must transmit
their votes to Congress.28
Article II, Section 1, clause 3 is at least as prescriptive. It provides that
electors will meet in their respective states and vote for two people, one of
whom must be a non-resident of the state. These electors will make a list of
all the persons receiving votes and how many votes they received. They will
then sign and certify the list and send it to Congress. Congress will assemble
and the President of the Senate will unseal the lists and count the votes. The
person receiving the most votes will be chosen as President. If no one receives a majority or there is a tie, the House of Representatives will choose
the President. Prior to the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment, the person who received the next highest vote would be named as Vice President.
In the case of a tie among the second-highest vote getters, the Senate would
choose the Vice President. In keeping with Article II, the Twelfth Amendment is similarly commanding. Among its many prescriptions, the Twelfth
Amendment requires the electors to meet in their respective states, to vote
separate ballots for President and Vice President, to keep track of those who
received votes, to sign, seal, and send the lists to Congress; Congress will
count the votes and the person who received the greatest number of votes for
President will be President.29

25
See James Madison, Journal (Sept. 4, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 493, 496–503 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S
RECORDS]; James Madison, Journal (Aug. 31, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra, at
475, 481.
26
Of course, the Twelfth Amendment made some changes to our presidential selection
process, but the basic structure remained the same.
27
Examples are numerous. What exactly is “due process” and “freedom of speech”; what
are “privileges and immunities”; and what is the scope of the “executive power of the United
States”?
28
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes further restrictions on the states. See
Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279 (2015).
29
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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The Constitution precludes the electors from meeting together as a
body of electors, which would presumably promote greater deliberation but
might subject the electors to outside or foreign influence and might lead to a
herd mentality. It almost seems as if the drafters of the text thought that the
relevant pool of qualified candidates, and their apparent qualifications,
would be self-evident to everyone, particularly to the ostensibly sagacious
electors.30 It is true that the Framers did not spend much time focusing on
the details of presidential selection—everyone expected that George Washington would be selected as the first President of the United States.31
Nothing in the Constitution specifies how the electors are to identify
candidates or how candidates make their case to the electors.32 There is
nothing to restrict (or guide) the judgment of the electors so that they could
appropriately separate out qualified from less qualified candidates. Pursuant
to Article II, Section 1, clause 3, electors must vote for one person who is
not a resident of the state. The Twelfth Amendment instructs: “The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and
Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same
state with themselves.” Article II, Section 1, clause 5 states that only individuals who are at least thirty-five years old, who have resided in the United
States for at least fourteen years, and who were born in the United States are
eligible to the presidency. Whatever the merits of these restrictions, they are
minimal and do not appear able, or intended, to constrain the discretion that
the text would seem to grant to the electors.33
If you take the text and structure of the Constitution and you take into
account both the drafting history and the intention of the Framers, the best
read of the text is that the Constitution created a federal office, of presidential “electors,” with a distinctive, prescriptive, and consequential responsibility.34 This was generally the view of legal commentators who examined the
issue outside of the context of litigation,35 and it was the position of a panel
of the Tenth Circuit in Baca v. Colorado Department of State.36
30
See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, Constitutional Construction, and the Problem of
Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 925 (2017) (“The patrician politics of the early republic allowed political elites to observe and evaluate the merit, intelligence, and work ethic of
each other while working together in state capitals, the federal capital, or foreign missions.”).
31
See Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1145, 1151 (2002).
32
The assumption was that presidential electors, as part of the ruling political elite, would
naturally be familiar with suitable candidates. See Whittington, supra note 30, at 926–27.
33
See Whittington, supra note 30, at 920 (“The constitutional provisions relating to the
appointment of the presidential electors and the casting of the electoral ballots for president are
not especially vague or open-textured. As a matter of straightforward textual interpretation, the
Constitution would seem to leave the presidential electors unbound in their decisionmaking.”).
34
The historian Alex Keyssar describes the electoral college as a “temporary legislature”
that would “disband as soon as it carried out its one function.” See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR,
WHY DO WE STILL HAVE THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE? 25 (2020).
35
See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 30, at 920.
36
See 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019).
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The parties in Baca presented the Tenth Circuit with two opposing
arguments. To Michael Baca, the determinative issue was whether the constitutional text confers discretion upon presidential electors. Baca anchored
his argument on the Supremacy Clause: he was performing a federal function and unless the Constitution explicitly allowed the state to direct the
votes of presidential electors, state regulation was inconsistent with the
Supremacy Clause. By contrast, from the State’s perspective, the determinative question was whether the constitutional text bars the states from compelling presidential electors to vote in a manner dictated by the state.
Colorado rested its argument on the Tenth Amendment, and the view that
the Amendment reserved the power to bind presidential electors to the
states, unless the Constitutional text explicitly provided differently.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Baca. Writing for the majority, Judge
McHugh began the analysis by articulating the majority’s interpretive framework. “As a general rule,” she noted, the Constitution must be interpreted
“according to its text,” though in certain contexts a court must also interpret
the Constitution in light of state practice.37 Relying on the constitutional
text, Article II and the Twelfth Amendment, the majority concluded that
“the Constitution provides no express role for the states after appointment of
its presidential electors.”38 Noting the prescriptive specificity of the text, the
Court remarked that the Constitution assigns “specific duties to identified
actors.”39 The states are authorized to appoint electors and they have wide
discretion to determine the process for selecting the electors. However, once
the states have selected their presidential electors, they have no further role
to play.40 “Instead, every step thereafter is expressly delegated to a different
body.”41 States have no authority under the Constitution to interfere with
the process of presidential selection once they have fulfilled their constitutionally assigned task, which is to simply appoint presidential electors.42
The court then concluded not only that the states lack the power to
interfere with the electors once they have been appointed, but also that presidential electors have a constitutional right to exercise their discretion when
voting for President and Vice President, as presidential electors. Article II
and the Twelfth Amendment, uses the words “elector,” “vote,” and “ballot.”
The court reasoned that those words, understood from the perspective of

37

Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 936 (10th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 942.
See id. (“Article II, as modified by the Twelfth Amendment, describes the process for
selecting the President and Vice-President in unusual detail.”); id. at 943 (“From the moment
the electors are appointed, the election process proceeds according to detailed instructions set
forth in the Constitution itself.”).
40
See id.
41
Id. at 942.
42
See id. at 943 (“In short, while the Constitution grants the states plenary power to
appoint their electors, it does not provide the states power to interfere once voting begins, to
remove an elector, to direct other electors to disregard the removed elector’s vote, or to appoint
a new elector to cast a replacement vote.”).
38
39
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those who were alive at the time they were written in the Constitution, “have
a common theme: they all imply a right to make a choice or voice an individual opinion.”43 The court thus concluded that “[i]t is beyond dispute that”
presidential electors “exercise unfettered discretion in casting their ballot at
the ballot box.”44
Using the standard approach to legal analysis—text, structure, intent of
the drafters, public and ordinary meaning of the text—the Tenth Circuit
reasoned that the Constitution unambiguously supports the conclusion that
presidential electors, not voters, select the President and Vice President. Efforts to limit their agency is inconsistent with the very text and structure of
the Constitution. The reasonable implications from the text and structure of
the Constitution are that the electors are agentic; their choices are supposed
to be consequential.45 They, not the voters, are the actors of constitutional
consequence.
Alternatively, one might argue that the text of the Constitution is silent
on the issue of elector discretion and that the Constitution’s silence should
be read in favor of state authority—including the power of the state to conclusively bind presidential electors and compel them to cast their ballot for a
pledged presidential candidate.46 This is Justice Thomas’s position in
Chiafalo.47 Justice Thomas examined the issue primarily on federalism
grounds. One of central purposes of the Constitution is to divide power between the states and the federal government, and federal power can be exercised only when it has been explicitly delegated to the federal government by
the Constitution. “When the Constitution is silent,” Justice Thomas wrote,
“authority resides with the States or the people. This allocation of power is
43

Id. at 945.
Id. The court did note, however, that presidential electors must abide by the minimal
requirements set out in the Constitution, such as the requirement that a candidate is not eligible to the presidency who does not meet the age, residency or citizenship requirement provided
for in the Constitution. See id. at 945 n.27.
45
See Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution’s
Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 219 (1995); David A. Strauss, Does the Constitution
Mean What it Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015) (noting in the context of the Electoral
College that the “practice is different from what the text seems to contemplate”); Whittington,
supra note 30, at 935–36 (“But the role of the presidential electors themselves is quite clear.
The constitutional text specifies that the electors will be appointed in a manner chosen by the
state legislatures and will cast ballots for president and vice president. Electors have few formal
limitations on their discretion when casting those ballots.”).
46
There is also an intermediate step between the position that the text affirmatively supports elector discretion versus the view that the text is silent but should be read in favor of state
power. One might argue that the text is silent and textual silence does not imply a normative
valence. The constitutional text is simply silent. Electors are free to follow directives on how
they should vote, from their states, their political parties, or any other institution. They are also
free to vote according to the dictates of their conscience. Either approach is consistent with the
constitutional text.
47
See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2333 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[T]he Constitution does not speak to States’ power to require Presidential electors to vote for
the candidates chosen by the people. . . . When the Constitution is silent, authority resides
with the States or the people.”).
44
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both embodied in the structure of our Constitution and expressly required by
the Tenth Amendment.” Justice Thomas goes on to explain that both the
structure and text of the Constitution delegates the process of Presidential
selection to the states, with very little for the federal government to do and
with no explicit restriction on the power of the states.48 Consequently, states
can compel electors to vote for the nominee chosen by the states’ voters, if
that is what the people of the states want to do.49
In sharp contrast of the position of the Tenth Circuit in Baca and Justice Thomas in Chiafalo, one might argue that the Constitution clearly authorizes the states to require putative electors to pledge that they will vote for
their party’s nominee and to punish them when they defect. This is supposedly the majority’s position in Chiafalo. Justice Kagan’s opinion in Chiafalo
purports to present a descriptive account of Article II, Section 1. Justice Kagan argued that Article II, Section 1 is an affirmative grant of power to the
States that allows them to lawfully induce an oath from would-be presidential electors and to sanction the electors if the electors defect. In fact, Justice
Kagan implied that the text is so clear that extralegal sources, such as the
intent of the framers, were not necessary to interpret the text.50
Justice Kagan’s legal analysis departed from the proposition that Article
II Section 1, the appointments power—“Each State shall appoint, in such
manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Electors . . .”—
was a broad grant of power to the States that authorizes them to appoint
electors, “in such manner” as they desire. From the power to appoint she
reasoned that the State also has the power to condition the “appointment—
that is, to say what the elector must do for the appointment to take effect.”51
As she explained: “A State can require, for example, that an elector live in
the State or qualify as a regular voter during the relevant time period.” From

48
Id. at 2335 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[P]owers related to electors reside with States to
the extent that the Constitution does not remove or restrict that power . . . . As the Court
recognizes, nothing in the Constitution prevents States from requiring Presidential electors to
vote for the candidate chosen by the people.”).
49
Another position: The Constitution is not silent on elector discretion, and the power of
the state to punish electors that defect on this issue should be read in favor of state power—
including a state’s decision to conclusively bind presidential electors and sanction them if they
do not cast their ballot as instructed—as opposed to reading the Constitution’s silence in favor
of the discretion of presidential electors to vote according their conscience and preference.
That is, the Constitution—its text and structure—is neutral and silent on whether the state
can require an oath as a condition of being an elector and whether a state can sanction the
elector through removal or the imposition of a fine. But for consequentialist or prudential
reasons one ought to read textual silence in favor of state power. State discretion allows for
flexibility and adaptability, necessary components of a constitution that is expected to last the
ages.
50
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2325–26 (“The Electors and their amici object that the Framers
using those words expected the Electors’ votes to reflect their own judgments. . . . But even
assuming other Framers shared that outlook, it would not be enough. Whether by choice or
accident, the Framers did not reduce their thoughts about electors’ discretion to the printed
page. All that they put down about the electors was what we have said . . . .”).
51
Id. at 2324.
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there she deduced that the power to condition also included the power to
instruct: “a State can insist . . . that the elector pledge to cast his Electoral
College ballot for his party’s presidential nominee, thus tracking the State’s
popular vote.” Next, in a move not obvious to the untrained eye, the power
to instruct included the power to sanction. Justice Kagan called this—in her
inimitably elegant style — “an associated condition of appointment.” As an
“associated condition of appointment,” the State “can demand that the elector actually live up to his pledge, on pain of penalty.” And then we come full
circle: under Article II, Section 1, the power to appoint presidential electors
necessarily includes the power to punish the elector for voting in a manner
inconsistent with the State’s preferences. As Justice Kagan put it, “the State’s
appointment power, barring some outside constraint, enables the enforcement of a pledge like Washington’s.”
Justice Kagan is undoubtedly right as a matter of logic that the power to
appoint could also include the power to sanction. But of course, that was not
the question before the Court—the question was not whether the power to
appoint could theoretically or in the abstract include the power to sanction if
the elector did not vote as specified by the state. The question before the
Court was whether the text of the Constitution, Article II, Section 1, clause
2, authorizes the state to eliminate elector discretion and to sanction the
elector as part of the State’s appointments power. As Justice Thomas rightly
notes in his concurrence, the power to appoint—Justice Thomas would call
this the “affirmative duty” to appoint—is different from “the broad power to
impose and enforce substantive conditions on appointment.” As one legal
commentator observed, state laws purporting to bind presidential electors
“seem[ ] highly dubious if we consult the text, history, and structure” of the
Constitution.52
Justice Kagan’s analysis elides this distinction, in part because of her
analogical style of reasoning. She wrote, for example, that “[a] State can
require . . . that an elector live in the State or qualify as a regular voter during
the relevant time period.”53 Surely a state can impose reasonable elector qualifications such as requiring that the elector be a resident of the state or that
the elector be eligible voter as part of the power to appoint the elector. These
qualifications are simply reasonable implications of the power to appoint,
unless the Constitution is crystal clear that such reasonable qualifications are
not permitted. Justice Kagan went on to provide another example, which she
ostensibly presented as the equivalent of the prior example. “Or,” she stated,
using the conjunction to connote equivalency, “more substantively, a State
can insist . . . that the elector pledge to cast his Electoral College ballot for
his party’s presidential nominee, thus tracking the State’s popular vote.”54 If
the state can require the elector to be a resident of the State as a condition of
52

Amar, supra note 45, at 219.
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324.
54
Id.
53
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appointment, Justice Kagan reasoned implicitly, it can certainly impose an
equivalent qualification, which is to require the elector to take an oath to
support the nominee of the elector’s party. This is the key step in Justice
Kagan’s analysis.55 If the state can require an oath, it must certainly have the
power to sanction defecting electors in order to enforce the oath. Using the
conjunction “or” once again to indicate equivalence among her examples,
Justice Kagan deploys the oath requirement as a bridge to her conclusion
that the state can “demand that the elector actually live up to his pledge,
upon pain of penalty.”56
To be fair to Justice Kagan, a number of Justices made similar moves at
oral argument. Chief Justice Roberts asked Professor Lawrence Lessig,
Chiafalo’s counsel whether “simply requiring an elector to take a pledge [is]
okay in your view?” “Absolutely,” Lessig replied. A pledge is simply a
“moral,” not a “legal obligation.” But if the state has the power to require a
pledge, Roberts asked, why does it not have the power to compel compliance
with the pledge? A state does not have such power, Lessig replied, because a
sanction is “a legal obligation. It crosses the line because the State has no
such power to impose such an obligation through law.”57 Justice Ginsburg
picks up precisely on this point. “It’s somewhat hard to understand the concept of something I am pledged, bound to do, I have made a promise to do
something but that promise is unenforceable.”58 Justice Breyer too wanted to
join in. “Counsel, a state can appoint people, requirement, that they be permanent residents of the state. That’s all right, isn’t it?”59 Lessig agreed that a
state could do that. And if the state can require the elector to be a permanent
resident of the state, Breyer reasons, can the state remove the elector if the
elector changes his or her residence such that the elector no longer meets the
residency requirement and provide for an alternate elector who meets the
residency requirement. Yes, Lessig agrees, the state can remove the nonresident elector and substitute a conforming elector. “What’s the difference
between that situation,” Breyer muses, “where they say, you must promise to
vote for the person who wins the most votes, and then he gets to the room,
and in that room, he doesn’t live up to that requirement . . . that he be a
resident of the state.”60 Justice Gorsuch expressed a similar concern. “[C]ould
a state say we’ll pay your expenses and give you a per diem for your service,
but only if you carry out your promise to vote in a particular way that you
pledged initially.”61 “No,” Lessig responded. “That is, in effect, a penalty as
55
See, e.g., id. at 2324 n. 6 (articulating cleanly the point that “a law penalizing faithless
voting (like a law merely barring that practice) is an exercise of the State’s power to impose
conditions on the appointment of electors”).
56
Id. at 2324.
57
Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020)
(No. 19-465).
58
Id. at 13–14.
59
Id. at 15.
60
Id. at 16.
61
Id. at 30.
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well.”62 This short exchange was followed by the question that kept tripping
up a number of Justices: “Why—why couldn’t it do that if it could do the
other things.”63
The Justices could not get beyond the fact that, as Justice Ginsburg
stated, a state can compel an elector to take an oath to support a particular
candidate but could not enforce the oath. One might argue that the majority
did not rely solely on analogical reasoning and deduction to support its argument that states can compel the elector to swear allegiance to the party’s
nominee as a condition of the appointment. The pledge requirement is
somewhat supported by the Court’s 1952 case, Ray v. Blair,64 in which the
Court upheld an Alabama law that refused to allow a potential presidential
elector to participate in the party’s primary election unless the elector
pledged to support the party’s nominee in the general election.
But Ray should have been confined to its facts. Ray is a political party
case not an electoral college case. Ray arose out of the Dixiecrat revolt in
1948. The Dixiecrats refused to support the Democratic Party’s presidential
nominee, Harry S. Truman. The Alabama Democratic Party responded by
enacting a state law precluding a candidate for elector from participating in
the Party’s primary unless the candidate pledged to support the Party’s nominee in the general election.
The Court in Ray noted the “longstanding practice” of electors supporting the nominee of his or her party.65 The Court then stated: “This longcontinued practical interpretation of the constitutional propriety of an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by a candidate for elector as to his vote in
the electoral college weighs heavily in considering the constitutionality of a
pledge, such as the one here required, in the primary.”66 The Court concluded that the pledge, in the primary, did not violate the Constitution.
But the Court distinguished between a pledge in the primary and the
Electoral College. The Court noted: “[E]ven if such promises for candidates
for the electoral college are legally unenforceable because violative of an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, . . . to
vote as he may choose in the electoral college, it would not follow that the
requirement of a pledge in the primary is unconstitutional.”67 This is because
a party pledge in the party’s primary simply enforces “the rules of the
party.”68 If the Alabama Democratic Party wants to require individuals who
wish to serve as the Party’s representatives to pledge to support the Party’s
general election candidate, that should be completely up to the Party and if
the State wants to pass a law to that effect, that should be up to the State.
62

Id.
Id.
64
343 U.S. 214 (1952).
65
Id. at 228–29.
66
Id. at 229–30.
67
Id. at 230.
68
Id.
63
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But, as the majority in Ray recognized, that is not the same question as one
asking whether the State—as opposed to a political party when it appoints
its electors as its representatives—is entitled to compel its presidential electors to take an oath—not adjuring that they will be truthful or that they will
faithfully perform their constitutional duty—but that they will vote a particular nominee. That question was not decided by Ray. Ray did not foreclose
the possibility that a pledge and a penalty requirement could violate Article
II, Section 1. At bottom, Ray and the pledge line of questioning were red
herrings.
Justice Kagan’s conclusion does not find succor in Ray, nor does it find
much support from the text of the appointment power of Article II, Section
1. Justice Kagan’s textual analysis depended entirely on her interpretation of
the State’s power to appoint.69 As she put it, “the power to appoint an elector
(in any manner)” conveyed “the broadest power of determination” over the
appointment.70 The explicit assumption of Justice Kagan’s analysis was that
the entity that has the power to make an appointment also as the power to
impose substantive constraints on the appointment. However, as Keith
Whittington noted: “Controlling election regulations is a far cry from controlling how those elected to an office will conduct themselves once in that
office.”71
Moreover, Justice Kagan’s assumption cannot be right as a general proposition. There are many areas of election law in which everyone concedes
that the state can impose qualifications for voters—electors—but cannot
prescribe how voters are supposed to vote. For example, the states can compel voters to register as prerequisite to voting. It can compel voters to live in
particular voting districts if they want to vote in those districts. It can require
voters to take a pledge that voters will truthfully provide certain pertinent
information. But no one would argue that because the state can promulgate
these types of qualifications, it can also, as an associated condition, compel
voters to vote for a specific candidate. Such a proposition would be absurd.
The Court rejected precisely that way of thinking in U.S. Term Limits
v. Thornton.72 In U.S. Term Limits, Arkansas argued that it had the right to
refuse to provide ballot access to candidates for the House of Representatives
who have already served three terms in the House and candidates for the
Senate who have already served to two terms in the Senate. Arkansas urged,
among its many arguments, that it had the power to exclude term-limited
69
Justice Thomas made a similar observation. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct.
2316, 2332 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Court’s theory is entirely premised on the
State exercising a power to appoint.” (emphasis in original)).
70
Id. at 2324 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)).
71
Whittington, supra note 30, at 920. Whittington further argues: “The manner of appointment could readily range from selecting the electors themselves, to authorizing the governor to appoint them, to authorizing the citizenry to elect them, and various other
permutations. Choosing the way electors are appointed, however, would not seem to suggest
that legislatures are empowered to instruct the elector on how to vote.” Id.
72
514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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candidates from the ballot under Elections Clause, Article I, Section 4,
which provides that “[t]he Times, places, and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof.” The Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens concluded that the power delegated to the States under the Elections Clause, the “Manner of holding Elections,” is “a grant of authority to
issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral
outcomes.” The Court in U.S. Term Limits was very clear that “manner”
means the power to enact electoral procedures, not the power to dictate substantive outcomes.73 As Justice Thomas recognized in his concurrence, there
is no textual basis for reading “manner” differently in Article II, Section 1
than how it is read in Article I, Section 4.74 There may be normative reasons
and consequentialist reasons for allowing states to penalize electors for not
voting as directed by the state. But the claim fails on textualist grounds.
II.

CHIAFALO

AND

HISTORICAL PRACTICE

Chiafalo cannot be justified on textualist grounds and quite frankly
Chiafalo is not a textualist case. Chiafalo fits with a recent line of Supreme
Court cases using historical practice to give meaning to the Constitution. In
fact, gloss featured in two other cases decided the same term, Financial
Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius75 and Trump v.
Mazars USA, LLP.76 Justice Sotomayor was the first to point to this path at
oral argument in Chiafalo. She suggested, in the form of a question of course,
“that historical practice since the founding offered a practical interpretation
of the Constitution.”77 And that practice favored state regulation of electors.
Justice Kagan, whose turn followed Justice Sotomayor, pushed the point ever
more aggressively, intimating that Chiafalo’s argument is undermined by
historical practice. “Mr. Lessig, if . . . your reading is . . . very deeply contextual, then shouldn’t we look to what happened in the very first elections
under the Constitution, where, you know, immediately, right away, electors
associated themselves with a political party, pledged their votes ahead of

73
See id. at 832–34 (“The Framers intended the Elections Clause to grant States authority
to create procedural regulations . . . . The Elections Clause give States authority ‘to enact
numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience show are necessary to
enforce the fundamental right involved.’” (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366)); id. at
835 (noting that state regulations under the Elections Clause are constitution where they regulate “elections procedures . . . and . . . not . . . substantive qualification[s] rendering a class of
potential candidates ineligible for ballot positions”).
74
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2330–31 (Thomas, J., concurring).
75
140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).
76
140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
77
Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020)
(No. 19-465).
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time, . . . and it’s that practice that has continued for over 200 years? . . .
[D]oesn’t . . . history suggest the opposite?”78
Under the guise of responding to arguments made by Chiafalo, in her
Chiafalo opinion, Kagan picks up right where she left off during oral argument. Quoting The Pocket Veto Case, Justice Kagan stated that ‘“[l]ong settled and established practice’ may have ‘great weight in a proper
interpretation of constitutional provisions.’”79 She noted that even though
the electors claimed that historical practice was on their side, “[e]lectors have
only rarely exercised discretion in casting their ballots.”80 The Nation’s history with presidential electors “points in the opposite direction.”81 To the
extent that electors have exercised discretion, those examples were anomalous and the exceptions that prove the rule.82 Electors have cast over 23,000
votes over the course of the relevant historical period and they have cast
approximately 180 faithless votes. And “because faithless votes have never
come close to affecting an outcome, only one has ever been challenged.”83
Though it is true that Congress counted the faithless vote, Justice Kagan
concluded that “the Electors cannot rest a claim of historical tradition on one
counted vote in over 200 years.”84
If one reads Chiafalo superficially, it would appear that Justice Kagan
used historical practice in Chiafalo in the “classical” manner assumed by the
academic literature—as a “gloss” to supplement the text. The text is clear
and historical practice serves as additional evidence that interpretation suggested by the text is correct. Consistent with that view, she told us twice in
the opinion that both the text and historical practice led to the same conclusion, in favor of the power of the states to control presidential electors.
However, as we argue in this part, Justice Kagan does not use gloss in
Chiafalo in the classical sense. Justice Kagan deploys historical practice not to
supplement the text, but to counter it.
To frame our argument, consider a thought experiment. Assume that
you are a person unfamiliar with American electoral practices but are interested in how Americans select their chief executive. Suppose that the text of
the United States Constitution is the only information you have available to
you. If you were to read the text and only the text, how closely would you be
able to recreate actual electoral practices? Let us now run the experiment in
the other direction. Suppose that you are a keen observer of American electoral practices and you want to deduce from your observation what the
American Constitution or even more broadly, what American law, such as
the Electoral Count Act, says about the process by which Americans elect
78

Id. at 28.
140 S. Ct. at 2326 (citing The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
See id. at 2328 (“The history going the opposite way is one of anomalies only.”).
83
Id.
84
Id.
79
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their chief executive. From your keen observation of democratic practices on
the ground, how closely could you recreate what the text says about how
Americans are to select their chief executive?
We surmise that it would be difficult to recreate the constitutional text
and structure if the only information you had to recreate the text came from
observing American democratic practices. Conversely, even the best reader
of the Constitution would be unable to recreate American electoral practices,
with respect to the election of the Nation’s chief executive, from simply
reading the text. The Constitution, its text and structure, appears to set up a
presidential selection process that seems to delegate a consequential choice
to a group of people that the Constitution refers to as electors. Presumably,
consistent with that delegation, the electors are to exercise their best judgment unbound, as a matter of law, by popular constraint. Consistent with
this view, the Constitution imposes few constraints on presidential electors,
which strongly implies that they are expected to exercise their independent
judgment and that their choices are to be consequential. The Constitution
does not provide any explicit direct role for popular input or control. And it
clearly does not provide a positive right to vote for President and Vice
President.
Notwithstanding the prescriptive specificity and clarity of the constitutional text, the way in which the Electoral College currently operates is not
what one would expect if one only read the text of the Constitution, at least
since political parties emerged on the scene.85 Whatever else it has to commend it, the process described in the Constitution for selecting the President
and Vice President—the Electoral College—is anachronistic.86 It fits uncomfortably with modern democratic norms, in which popular control is the
sine qua non of democratic legitimacy. Recall here the reapportionment
revolution and its declaration that constitutional equality in the exercise of
the franchise demands one-person, one-vote. With respect to the Electoral
College, polling majorities seem to agree and would prefer the direct election
of the President.87 Critics of the Electoral College focus specifically on the
delegate allocation formula, which provides a bonus to smaller states and
does not proportionally reflect the voting power of voters in larger states,88

85
See Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 928–29 (2001).
86
See, e.g., Ethan J. Lieb & Eli J. Mark, Democratic Principle and Electoral College Reform,
106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS, 105, 105 (2008) (“The electoral college is a relic
from another time . . . .”).
87
See Stephen Shepard, Poll: Voters Prefer Popular Vote over Electoral College, POLITICO
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/27/poll-popular-vote-electoral-college-1238346 [https://perma.cc/M39M-TAMC].
88
This critique is of a piece with general criticisms about the undemocratic nature of the
U.S. Constitution. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT)
(2008). For a terrific defense of “the power of states to administer elections, and, more specifically, to determine voter eligibility,” what he calls the “invisible federalism” that protects the
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an inconsistency that is clearly at odds with the one-person, one-vote
conception.
Keeping with modern ideas of democratic equality and political legitimacy, as a matter of democratic practice, we have a selection mechanism that
is roughly populist, though a person unfamiliar with the American practice
of presidential selection would not logically infer a roughly populist selection
process from the text and structure of the Constitution. If you only read the
text, you would not guess that American citizens, in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia, participate in party primaries or caucuses and hold a
general election purporting to elect their chief executive. In fact, you would
be perplexed as to why residents of Puerto Rico vote in party primaries for
President in light of the fact that they are not entitled to any presidential
electors.
As a matter of American political practice, the Electoral College is not
an independent selection mechanism that in fact chooses the chief executive.
This is one of the bases for criticizing the Electoral College when the Electoral College winner does not match the winner of the popular vote. To the
extent that the constitutional text assumes the independence of presidential
electors as a collective of deliberative institutions that would engage in genuine deliberations in their respective states and uninfluenced by political faction or group bias, things have not worked out that way. All of the states
select presidential electors via popular elections. Indeed, even before we get
to the general election, we have a party primary system that essentially invites putative candidates, anyone who believes that they can capture the attention of the public, to participate. And for the most part, they do. If there
is any wisdom in the process, it is the wisdom of the crowd and not of
sagacious respected elders quadrennially debating the fate of the Republic.
As a matter of political practice, presidential electors are selecting from
a pool of candidates, usually two, which the voting public has narrowed for
them.89 Put charitably, the process itself is very much a popularity contest,
mediated by the political parties. As a matter of American political practice,

Electoral College against reform efforts, see Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the
Electoral College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237, 1239 (2012).
89
And of course, it is misleading to suggest that presidential electors select the president—implying independent agency. Our two political parties identify and select a slate of
presidential electors who are generally partisans of unquestioned loyalty. The historical record
makes clear that parties have done a good job of choosing party loyalists. Few electors have
defected; instances of “faithless electors” are comparatively few. See Faithless Electors,
FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/faithless_electors [https://perma.cc/8H9V-P9TG] (last
updated July 6, 2020). In fact, the very concept of a “faithless elector” is arguably aconstitutional. If the constitutional design set up these electors to exercise their own judgment, in
whatever way they saw fit, then the constitutional text/history does not recognize the concept
of “faithless elector”. By constitutional definition, they cannot be faithless.
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presidential electors have seen their roles reduced to mere ciphers or passive
agents.90 They are, at best, constitutional actors of no consequence.
And this historical devolvement is perfectly consistent with the text and
structure of the Constitution—or so the majority argues. The Constitution,
Justice Kagan tells us, “took no position on how independent from—or how
faithful to—party and popular preferences the electors’ votes should be.”91
Or as she would put it elsewhere in the opinion, the “Constitution is
barebones about electors.”92 The “Constitution left much to the future,” to
the evolutionary practices of the nation. “And the future did not take long in
coming.” The Nation soon developed a practice by which “presidential electors became trusty transmitters of other people’s decisions.”93
Though Chiafalo often reads as if Justice Kagan was providing a descriptive account of Article II, Section 1, she was not. Historical practice is
responsible for much of the analytical work in the opinion. And though
courts, for understandable reasons, are reluctant to argue that practice can
and should trump a clear text, commentators are not so constrained.
The majority’s argument Chiafalo is an example of a phenomenon described by Professors Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel by which assertions of
textual clarity are themselves “often affected by interpretive considerations
that are commonly thought to be extratextual,” such as historical practice.94
Bradley and Siegel were specifically addressing perceptions of ambiguity in
the text which is often used to justify the application or non-application of
extratextual modalities of constitutional interpretation.95 By contrast and
contrary to the story that most legal academics tell about when courts use
extratextual methods to interpret the text,96 Justice Kagan claimed that the
text was clear and used an extratextual modality to give meaning to the
Constitution.
Building on Bradley and Siegel, our point here is that Justice Kagan’s
argument about the clarity and directionality of the text—that the text is
clear and that it supports state laws that punish electors that defect from the
state’s directive—is constructed. The considerations that are potentially relevant to resolve the meaning of the text may also be relevant to determining

90
See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 201,
204 (1996) (describing the electors as “faceless scriveners whose only real job” is “to ratify what
the voters had already decided”).
91
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020).
92
Id. at 2324.
93
Id. at 2326.
94
Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text,
64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1238 (2015).
95
See id. (“Participants in American constitutional practice typically agree that, when the
constitutional text is clear, it is controlling. They often debate, however, whether the text is
clear and, to that it is not, what should be consulted in resolving textual ambiguities.”).
96
See id. at 1241 (“Nontextual modalities can appropriately be considered, according to
the orthodox view, only to resolve ambiguities in the text.”).
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both the clarity of the text and its directionality.97 Thus, Justice Kagan’s declaration in Chiafalo that the text is clear—and that it supports the right of
the states to bind electors—cannot be viewed in isolation. It cannot be fully
understood if separated from the influence, the decisive influence, of historical practice as an extratextual modality. And it is the extratextual lever that is
doing the heavy lifting in the analysis.
III. COMPETING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATION
PARTICIPATION

AND

POLITICAL

Once we understand that evidence from the text of the Constitution
and evidence from historical practice point in different directions with regard
to the discretion of presidential electors, we can better understand the work
that historical practice is doing in Chiafalo. It provides a basis for Justice
Kagan to pick between two competing views of representation and political
participation with respect to presidential selection. One view is supported by
the text and the other view by historical practice. Through historical practice, Justice Kagan is providing a font for a modern conception of consequential political participation and attempting to modernize the Electoral
College to make it more consistent with contemporary notions of
representation.
The Electoral College reflects the Framers’ elitist conception on political participation and representation. “The institution would function as yet
another buffer between ‘the people’ and their government.”98 Presidential
electors, not citizens, were given the power to choose the Nation’s most important offices. They would indirectly represent the people and choose what
is best for them. The states, specifically, their legislatures, were given the
task of choosing the electors. The Electoral College’s allocation formula only
indirectly reflects populist influences. Moreover, if no candidate receives a
majority of electoral votes, the Constitution’s “contingent election system”

97
This formulation borrows from and extends a similar formulation in Bradley and Siegel.
See id. at 1242 (“[T]he same considerations that are potentially relevant in resolving the meaning of ambiguous text can also affect the perceived clarity of the text in the first instance.”).
Our formulation deemphasizes the focus on ambiguity; as Chiafalo demonstrates, extratextual
modalities can be applied even to texts that are offered as clear and controlling. We add to the
Bradley & Siegel formulation the direction or the substantive content that a court gives to the
text. Directionality is important because both sides of a dispute often argue that the text favors
them and sometimes both parties claim, as in Chiafalo, that historical practice or other types of
extratextual modalities are on their side. As we have noted, almost all of the scholars who have
examined the question have concluded that the text is clear and it supports elector discretion.
The Court, of course, held that the text is clear and that it supports the states. The emphasis
on directionality shows that extratextual modalities come into play not just to inform clarity
but also substantive meaning.
98
ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 31.
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kicks in,99 and the House selects the President with each state voting as a
bloc.
This process of presidential selection is heavily dependent upon elites
who will both blunt the preferences of the people and act in their best interest, rising above factions and parochialism. Notably, Justice Harlan featured
this conception of representation in his dissent in Reynolds. “[P]eople are not
ciphers,” Harlan offered, and “legislators can represent their electors only by
speaking for their interests—economic, social, political—many of which do
reflect the place where the electors live.”100 It precludes direct participation
by the demos in favor of the states and political elites.
The Constitution does not give voters a right to vote for President and
Vice President. The text of the Constitution does not even give the voters a
right to vote for presidential electors. Voters have no right to participation—
at least not under the Constitution—in the process of presidential selection.
The Constitution leaves it up to the states to decide what role if any voters
ought to play in the process. If a state decides not to grant its voters the
privilege of voting for presidential electors, and we use the word privilege
intentionally, it does not have to do so.
Indeed, it is remarkable how important the states are under the Constitution when it comes to political participation. Two of the great oddities of
the U.S. Constitution, for those unfamiliar with American constitutional
history, is that it allocates much of the power to regulate federal elections to
the states and that it views the states as units to be represented. States are
both the foci of and medium for representation. The Constitution interweaves state and national regulatory power over elections in numerous ways.
One example is Article I, Section 4.101 This provision gives states in the first
instance the express power to regulate national elections for Congress,
though it preserves for Congress ultimate authority over the subject. Another example is Article I, Section 2, clause 1.102 One could also add the
Seventeenth Amendment to this list.103 Thus, the Constitution not only provides that the states have the initial responsibility for regulating federal elections; it also provides that the states set voting qualifications for

99
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, WHY DO WE STILL HAVE THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE? 3
(2020).
100
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 623–24 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
101
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of
Chusing Senators.”).
102
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of
the State Legislature.”).
103
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“The electors in each State shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”).
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Congressional elections. And unlike the times, places, and manners clause,104
which provides for Congressional oversight, the only limitation here is that
the same voter qualifications apply to both state and federal electors.
Additionally, in both the Senate and in the Electoral College the states
are represented qua states. State representation is one of the institutional
arguments often offered in defense of the Electoral College. Wyoming and
Maine deserve representation qua states, not as a function of the size of their
population. To be sure, the states are not represented in the College to the
same degree as they are in the Senate; but their allocation is far greater than
mere population numbers would grant them.
The architects of the American Constitution were famously concerned
about mob rule.105 James Madison specifically worried that popular majorities could not adequately protect private rights and public goods.106 His solution was a mixed system, one that reflects ideals of popular sovereignty and
direct representation. But that system also depended upon political elites,
enlightened statesmen, who would rise above factional interests and deliberate over the public good. There is no better example of that balance than the
selection method created by the framers for electing members of the House,
elected via direct election,107 versus Senators, who were selected by state legislatures in the Constitution’s original design.108 The Electoral College takes
up both approaches and combines them into its formula for allocating electors.109 We would venture to wager that if Americans were starting anew
today, we would not choose the same system created by the Founders.
Moreover, Americans today are unlikely to find the states as compelling entities to be represented. The Founders’ worries two centuries ago were different than the concerns that drive us today. But we are stuck with the vision of
the Framers because their vision is entrenched in the Constitution. Or are
we?

104
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (authorizing the states to prescribe the “times, places and
manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives.”); Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67,
69 (1997) (“The [Elections] Clause is a default provision; it invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices.”).
105
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)
(Gideon ed., 2001) (“Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly
would still have been a mob.”).
106
See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV.
245, 252 (1990); Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 476
(1988).
107
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 provides: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 provides: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof . . . .”
108
This was not changed until the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913,
which brought the method for electing Senators into line with the method for electing
Representatives.
109
See ROBERT M. ALEXANDER, REPRESENTATION AND THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 31
(2019).
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Contrast this concept of political participation and representation with
that being vindicated by Justice Kagan in Chiafalo. Justice Kagan is the Democracy Justice. Her aim in Chiafalo is of a piece with her uncharacteristically blistering dissent in the political gerrymandering case Rucho v. Common
Cause.110 In Rucho, Kagan took the majority to task for concluding that federal courts do not have the power to decide partisan gerrymandering cases
because those cases raised political questions that were best decided by the
political process. Kagan argued emphatically that political gerrymandering is
unconstitutional because it “deprive[s] citizens of the most fundamental of
their constitutional rights,” which are “the rights to participate equally in the
political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to
choose their political representatives.”111 Partisan gerrymandering is not just
objectionable because it “debase[s] and dishonor[s] our democracy,” it is particularly pernicious because it “turn[s] upside down the core American idea
that all governmental power derives from the people.”112
Chiafalo is an attempt, through the method of historical practice, to
vindicate the same family of constitutional rights that Justice Kagan could
not get the Court to vindicate in Rucho. She launches her opinion in Chiafalo
by sounding the alarm that the presidential selection process may be selling a
misleading bill of goods to the voters. She notes that even though voters
“vote” for a presidential candidate every four years, they are in fact only selecting their state’s presidential electors, who will later select the President.113
The worry, of course, is that even though voters expect that their participation and their votes will be consequential, elector discretion would make
those votes irrelevant.
Though the Framers did not provide for direct political participation by
the people, the people themselves developed a political practice of consequential political participation, to borrow from Larry Kramer.114 They exercised agency within the open crevices of the text and structure of the
Constitution. Justice Kagan’s opinion tells the story of the Nation’s progression from an elitist presidential selection process as directed by the text to a
populist political practice that better reflected the people’s evolutionary expectations of consequential political participation. She closes the opinion
with a populist battle cry and clarion call: “here, We the People rule.”115
She reminds us early in the opinion that the Electoral College was not
the product of sustained deliberation by the Framers.116 Moreover, the Con-

110

139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
112
Id.
113
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020).
114
See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 215 (2004).
115
See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328.
116
See id. at 2320 (“Our Constitution’s method of picking Presidents emerged from an
eleventh-hour compromise.”).
111
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stitutional text is very thin.117 If that were not enough, this last minute,
barebones framework became antiquated as well as “unworkable” as soon as
it was tested. This is because the Framers’ “plan failed to anticipate the rise
of political parties.”118 The United States ratified the Twelfth Amendment in
1804, which was intended to fix the broken presidential selection system.
“The Amendment thus brought the Electoral College’s voting procedures
into line with the Nation’s new party system.”119 Soon thereafter, voters
would use political parties as the mechanism for asserting popular control on
presidential selection. “By 1832, . . . all States but one had introduced popular presidential elections.” And “advanced, rather than resisted, the practice
that had arisen in the Nation’s first elections.”120
In the early part of the twentieth century, voters likely understood
themselves to be voting for presidential candidates directly, instead of voting
for presidential electors. By the middle part of the twentieth century states
passed statutes requiring presidential electors to vote the nominee of their
party. Laws that penalize electors for defecting are only the latest developments of an evolutionary process that attempts to transmit as faithfully as
possible the people’s preferences in order to fulfill the expectations of the
voters’ that they have a right to vote for President and that their votes will
count; it will matter.
Justice Kagan views the people—not the presidential electors or the
states—as agentic. Recall here once more the reapportionment revolution
and its one-person, one vote mantra. In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court
famously declared, “[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres.”121
What matters for Justice Kagan is not the selection process referenced in the
text but the “vote of millions of . . . citizens”122 who are to be represented. As
a matter of democratic practice, voters have come to expect that they will
vote for the president. They do not expect their votes to be an empty exercise. And they have come to expect that if their candidate receives the most
votes, their candidate will prevail. Washington’s and Colorado’s laws are
constitutional according to Justice Kagan because they are attempting to
meet the expectation of the voters through the mechanism of presidential
selection by ensuring direct representation—or as direct as is possible under
the structural limitation of the constitution.

117
See id. (“The provision that they approved about presidential electors is fairly slim.”); see
also id. at 2324 (“The Constitution is barebones about electors.”).
118
Id. at 2320.
119
Id. at 2321.
120
Id. at 2327.
121
377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964).
122
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020).
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IV. JUSTIFYING GLOSS
In Chiafalo, the majority uses historical practice to impose meaning
upon the text of the Constitution, yet it does so in a manner that is arguably
inconsistent with a straightforward reading of that text. The Electoral College offers an intriguing constitutional puzzle. The text and structure of the
Constitution direct a particular process for selecting the nation’s chief executive that seems to leave the selection process to elites and the states. Yet, that
is not what happens as a matter of evolutionary constitutional practice. Presidential selection is a function of mass popularity and party politics. The
Electoral College operates in a manner that is arguably inconsistent with the
text but certainly inconsistent with the structural orientation of the Constitution. These clashes between the text and practice are not unusual and
scholars have noticed them in many contexts including in the context of the
Electoral College. Chiafalo raises an important and fundamental question
about justifications for gloss. When, if ever, are courts justified in entrenching constitutional meaning derived from historical practice, particularly in the face of contrary meaning from the text and structure of the
Constitution?
If there is an approach that anticipated the Court’s reasoning in
Chiafalo and provides the best account of the decision, in retrospect it is
Whittington’s argument that the historical practices of presidential electors
after the Founding have essentially amended the Constitution.123 Though
conceding that the text of the Constitution clearly and unambiguously supports the conclusion that presidential electors are entitled to exercise their
discretion free from state constraint,124 Whittington argues that the Constitution should be interpreted to allow states to direct the electors’ preferences.
This is because—notwithstanding the text or the intent of the Framers—“by
1796, the presidential electors were an afterthought. The voters were making
up their own minds as to who should be president, and the electors were
expected to do what they were told.”125 For more than two hundred years,
presidential electors have been reduced to the role of mere scriveners, shorn
of agency.
Whittington maintains that this long historical practice—electors acting as delegates rather than as trustees—has effectively amended the Constitution and “established” an “unwritten and informal” but “new constitutional
rule.”126 Whittington calls these unwritten and informal rules “constitutional
constructions.” “Constitutional constructions supplement [constitutional] interpretations by establishing the practical meaning of the foundational docu123
Indeed, Justice Kagan cites Whittington in support of her claim that after 1796, everyone expected electors to act as instructed by those who appointed them, be they legislatures or
voters. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2326.
124
See Whittington, supra note 30, at 935–36.
125
Id. at 927.
126
Id.
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ment and guiding the behavior of government officials.”127 Put differently, a
sufficiently long practice changes the meaning of the text and tells democratic citizens, including constitutional interpreters, what behavior is consistent with the Constitution and what behavior is not. Returning to the
context of the Electoral College, as a consequence of changed political practices since the Founding, the “practical construction of the Constitution has
been that the presidential electors were to formally record the vote of the
people of the states in which they were chosen, not exercise independent
judgment in selecting a president. They were to be clerks, not kingmakers.”128 Thus, notwithstanding the prescriptions of Constitutional text and
the implications of its structure, as a practical matter long-standing political
practice trumps clear text.
Whittington does not offer a justification for preferring practice over
text. Moreover, and as Chiafalo shows, the distinction between an unwritten
and informal practice and a written one is extremely thin. All that is required
is for some government to formalize the practice through codification. In his
2015 Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, David Strauss addresses this
question head-on.129 Professor Strauss starts his article by recounting the
question posed by the late Justice Antonin Scalia to then-Solicitor General
Donald Verrilli, Jr. during the oral argument of NLRB v. Noel Canning, in
which the Court was deciding whether a President has the power to make
recess appointments.130 Justice Scalia asked what should happen if a longstanding practice conflicts with the clear text of the Constitution. The implication of Justice Scalia’s question was that a clear text should certainly prevail
over political practice, even a long-standing political practice. The Solicitor
General answered that practice should trump text. The Solicitor General
added that the circumstance hypothesized by Justice Scalia—a clear text yet
contrary practice — is rare in American constitutional law, implying that
resolving those rare conflicts do not pose much of a threat to our standard
approaches to constitutional interpretation.
Not so, says Strauss. “If we read the text of the Constitution in a
straightforward way, American constitutional law ‘contradicts’ the text of the
Constitution more often than one might think. Or, in the words of Issacharoff and Morrison, “practice-based institutional settlements are pervasive in the law.”131 Adhering to the text, Strauss notes, would require us to
relinquish many of the most important and well-established principles of
constitutional law.”132 Though not central to his Foreword, one of the examples that Professor Strauss provides in passing is the Electoral College. He
observes that while the method of presidential selection can be squared with
127

Id.
Id. at 936.
129
See Strauss, supra note 45.
130
573 U.S. 513 (2014).
131
Issacharoff & Morrison, supra note 20 at 1917.
132
Strauss, supra note 45, at 3.
128

R
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the text, “the practice is different from what the text seems to contemplate.”133 These types of examples, clashes between clear text and contrary
constitutional practice, dot the landscape of American constitutional law.
Strauss calls these clashes between clear text and contrary outcomes,
anomalies, a term of art which for him means clashes that “call into question
our familiar way of thinking about the relationship between the text of the
Constitution and constitutional law.”134 Anomalies help us to understand
that the text is less decisive in interpreting the Constitution than we believe.
Under the standard account of constitutional interpretation, the constitutional text always controls, when the text is clear. We only go beyond the
text when there is no text available or when the text is ambiguous. Professor
Strauss argues that the standard account does not provide an accurate
description of what constitutional interpreters actually do when they interpret the Constitution. “Clear text does not always govern . . . .”135 We do not
interpret the Constitution by starting with the text—recall here the Tenth
Circuit majority’s contrary starting premise in Baca—“constitutional law resembles the common law much more closely than it resembles a text-based
system.”136 Refining the description slightly, Professor Strauss argues we
have a “mixed system, composed of both text and precedent.”137 And text is
itself a kind of precedent that needs to be reconciled and harmonized with
other types of precedent.
Strauss argues that constitutional interpretation is “an effort to accommodate three institutional interests . . . in sovereignty, adaptation, and settlement.”138 By sovereignty, he seems to mean an institution, such as a
legislature, that is democratically accountable and can be responsive to the
needs of the demos. Adaption allows the legal system to respond to changed
circumstances. Settlement permits the legal system to identify the matters
that are not contestable because the benefit of having a clear rule outweigh
whatever benefits might come from a reconsideration of the matter.
Strauss acknowledges that a legal system toggling among these three
interests will not always yield a bright-line rule to guide the behavior of
constitutional actors. Adherence to clear text must be justified as necessary to
accommodate one of the three interests and “if we cannot justify adherence
to the text by reference to those interests, then we should—in fact, we do—
depart from it.”139 With respect to the Electoral College, Professor Strauss
implies that states can limit the discretion of presidential electors though he
does not provide a full defense of the point.140
133

Id. at 22.
Id. at 4.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 13.
138
Id. at 53.
139
Id. at 54.
140
See id. at 57 (noting with seeming approval that we have seen a “common law-like
evolution” that has “diminished” “the power of presidential electors”).
134
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One possible defense is Professor Mark Tushnet’s constitutional
workaround framework.141 A constitutional workaround is a political solution for getting around a clear constitutional text that stands in the way of a
desired political outcome.142 Take as one illustrative example the National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact proposal, which Tushnet uses to demonstrate the concept. The Compact is a proposed agreement among the states
and the District of Columbia to award their electoral votes to the presidential candidate that wins the national popular vote, as opposed to the candidate that wins the statewide vote (or district vote, in the case of Maine and
Nebraska). The Compact is designed to work around the requirements of
Article II and the Twelfth Amendment.143 Though the Constitution obviously and clearly specifies the mechanism for electing the President and Vice
President, it does not explicitly preclude each state from awarding their electoral votes to the national vote winner, given that under Chiafalo they can
compel their presidential electors to do so.
Relying on his previous work,144 Tushnet suggests that the acceptability
of workarounds might depend upon whether they are working around provisions that implicate the “thick” or “thin” Constitution. The thick Constitution is the part of the Constitution that sets up and regulates the
government.145 It does not reflect deep or controversial political, moral, or
constitutional value judgments. Take the requirement that the President has
to be thirty-five years old. It reflects a shallow and not very controversial
intuition that the President must be someone of sufficient maturity to run
the government. This is the equivalent of Strauss’s settlement justification:
we just need to coordinate around one outcome. By contrast, there are other
provisions in the Constitution that implicate deeper and more fundamental
values, such equality, liberty, and autonomy.146
Professor Tushnet argues that workarounds that attempt to work
around the thick Constitution are not objectionable.147 This is because the
141

See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009).
Professor Tushnet explains that Constitutional workarounds “arise (a) when there is
significant political pressure to accomplish some goal, but (b) some parts of the Constitution’s
text seem fairly clear in prohibiting people from reaching that goal directly, yet (c) there appear
to be other ways of reaching the goal that fit comfortably within the Constitution.” Id. at 1503.
143
Professor Tushnet states that a constitutional workaround is one that is itself authorized by the text of the Constitution. See id. at 1503–04. It is not clear to us why textual
authorization is a necessary conceptual component of the definition. In fact, we would argue
that it detracts from it. If constitutional actors are choosing between two texts that point in
different directions, it is hard to call the process of reconciling opposing textual commitments a
workaround. What seems to make a workaround a workaround is that the Constitution prohibits a particular means, which also implies the prohibition of a particular purpose. Political
actors are able to achieve the impliedly-prohibited purpose through a means that is not prohibited by the Constitution.
144
See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
145
See id. at 9.
146
See id. at 11.
147
See Tushnet, supra note 142, at 1511; id. at 1507.
142
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provisions of the thick Constitution are anachronistic; they are no longer
relevant to the “structure of a well-functioning government.”148 But
workarounds that attempt to work around the thin Constitution are problematic, presumably, because they challenge fundamental values, which if
they are to be changed ought to be changed through the standard mechanisms that we use for amending the Constitution.
The problem is that the constitutional provisions that we want to work
around are the ones that are often the most normatively contestable. In
Tushnet’s parlance, they are part of the thin Constitution. Thus, normative
justifications really matter because we will be choosing among options that
are deeply contestable and deeply contested.
Chiafalo raises a number of difficult collateral methodological questions
for gloss as a judicial method of constitutional interpretation. We focus on
two here: how do we determine the relevant historical practice that counts as
gloss and what counts as settled practice? We then turn to what we view as
the fundamental question, which is articulating the normative values that
justify the deployment of gloss. Put differently, under what circumstances
should the federal courts essentially amend the Constitution by giving effect
to one set of institutional arrangements when those institutional arrangements are inconsistent with the text or inconsistent with a competing set of
institutional arrangements? This is a difficult question and the answer must
turn on normative justifications offered to prefer practice to text.
First, what is the relevant practice that counts as a historical practice for
the purpose of applying gloss?149 If historical practice is to serve as a modality
that courts can use to interpret the Constitution, it is important to identify
the relevant practice with a great deal of specificity and it is equally important to develop a methodology for identifying the relevant practice. We
know that gloss applies to governmental practice.150 Professor Curtis Bradley
provides some extremely important guidance, which is particularly useful in
the context of separation of powers and foreign affairs. He explains for example, that historical practice can, and arguably must, include congressional
statutes, “presidential actions intended to have binding effect,” committee
reports, legal memoranda and the like.151
As importantly, Bradley explains that what counts as practice and as
doing gloss depends upon the normative justifications using gloss as a modality of constitutional interpretation.152 This is a fundamental point with
which we agree and upon which we build below. But we might also make
148

Id. at 1511.
See Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 69–72 (2017) (addressing
this question in context of separation of powers).
150
See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the
Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2020).
151
Bradley, supra note 150, at 69–70.
152
See id. at 70; id. at 64 (“Any consideration of who to ‘do’ and approach is inevitably
intertwined with normative questions about the value of the approach, and that is true of the
gloss approach to constitutional interpretation.”).
149
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some headway on the question by thinking about the following points. As a
point of departure, we might determine whether the relevant practice ought
to be identified at the broadest or narrowest level of generality. This is critical because choosing the level of generality often essentially decides the constitutional question. Or, we might ask whether the relevant practice ought to
mirror, and if so, how exactly, the facts that gave rise to the dispute. Further,
we might need to identify the vantage point for determining the relevant
historical practice. For instance, using Chiafalo as illustrative, are we to examine the historical behavior of the states—and if so, which states? All of
them? Just the states involved in the dispute; or only the states of the electors
involved?153
The facts that gave rise to Chiafalo offer at least three possible relevant
practices, which range from broad to narrow, that we might identify as the
relevant historical practice. Perhaps at the broadest level of generality, we
might ask whether electors have generally voted the preferences of those who
selected them. Here we are looking at historical practice from the vantage
point of electors and asking whether there is a long-established pattern of
electors who have always voted per the instructions of others. Alternatively,
we can switch our vantage point and ask whether states have generally required electors to take an oath to support the nominee of their party as a
condition of being selected as an elector. Lastly, at the narrowest level of
generality, we might ask whether states have penalized electors who have
defected and what types of penalties states have leveled.
Second, how do we determine whether a practice is settled and who has
the burden of showing that the practice is settled? As Professors Bradley and
Siegel note, the goal is to identify practice that is longstanding. Moreover, a
longstanding practice need not be unbroken. “[M]odern practice can potentially qualify as gloss even if it differs from earlier practice.”154 However,
there is no agreement on the Court or among academics for figuring out
when a practice is settled.
This inquiry is made more complicated by the methodological questions we have already noted, such as uncertainty about the relevant practice
and the distinctive vantage points of the actors involved in the dispute. Do
we have a settled history of elector defections? Yes, we do. The first one is
believed to have been Samuel Miles in 1796 and depending how you count,
there have been as many as 196 faithless electors in American history.155 And
the history of people complaining against faithless electors is just as long.156
Do we have a long history of citizens voting for presidential electors? Yes, we
do. Citizens in Maryland and in Pennsylvania were voting to elect presiden153
It is because of these types of complications that some commentators are reluctant to
apply historical gloss outside of the context of separation of powers. See, e.g., Bradley, supra
note 18 at 64, Bradley & Morrison, supra note 19 at 416.
154
Bradley & Siegel, supra note 148, at 19.
155
See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 131.
156
See KEYSSAR, supra note 100, at 31.
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tial electors as early as 1789.157 By 1876, every state selected their electors by
popular elections.158 Do we have a settled history of states requiring electors
to take an oath as a condition of being appointed as an elector? Well, that
question is more complicated. Some states have a long history of doing so,
for more than 100 years. But only 30 states, and the District of Columbia,
currently have an oath requirement. Twenty states have no such requirement.159 And even fewer states penalize electors who defect. Penalties for
violations are very recent and they vary. Most states who penalize defecting
electors simply do so by replacing them. A few provide criminal sanctions,
including a fine. Thus, even though some states have had some of these laws
in their books, those states have been few, and those penalties have been a
comparatively recent development. It is difficult, then, to say that there is a
settled history of requiring electors to pledge.
Third, what is the justification for using gloss to entrench one interpretation of the constitution over a competing interpretation? One fundamental
worry about using historical practice to entrench constitutional meaning is,
as Professor Adrian Vermuele has argued, “the inherent lack of democratic
responsiveness and accountability” in the generation of the practice.160 Recall
here as well David Strauss’s concern about sovereignty, which raises a similar
worry. Democratic legitimacy worries are particularly acute in the context of
law and democracy—as, for example, compared to the separation of powers
context—to the extent that courts are using historical practices of some
states or individual actors to bind the whole country by entrenching those
practices through constitutional interpretation. Put differently, whereas it
might make sense to talk of “the Presidency” as an institution, with continuity over time, and perhaps it might also make sense to think of “Congress” in the same way, it is probably less useful and maybe even incoherent
to talk about presidential electors—and thus “the Electoral College”—as an
institution, implying temporal continuity. The deployment of gloss in some
domains might raise more or less legitimacy considerations than the deployment of gloss in other domains.
There are a number of possible justifications for using gloss as a method
of constitutional interpretation. Professor Curtis Bradley offers four justifications that courts sometimes use when they apply gloss to interpret the Constitution, particular in the separation of powers context.161 Courts apply
gloss: as deference to nonjudicial actors, when those actors are viewed as
equal—to courts—interpreters of the Constitution; as a consequence of the
limitations on judicial capacity when the text of the Constitution is insufficient to supply the materials for robust judicial analysis; and for Burkean
consequentialist reasons, by which courts defer to what has worked before;
157

See id. at 32.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 5.
159
See id. at 134–35.
160
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 283, 300 (2015).
161
See Bradley, supra note 150, at 59.
158
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and reliance interests.162 Professors Issacharoff and Morrison point to the
telos of government. “Ours is a constitution of making things work under
conditions of uncertainty. It is a domain conditioned by experience in governance, by the imprecise processes of institutional accommodation.”163 Issacharoff and Morrison argue that courts tend to enforce the settlements
arrive through practice when they “discern an enforceable constitutional
norm from the contours of historical practice.”164
Understanding the justifications for the deployment of historical practice is important not only for democratic legitimacy reasons but also because
normative justifications shape the methodological considerations that determine how courts apply historical practice and thus derive constitutional
meaning. That is, normative justifications construct and constrain —to borrow from, and expand, Bradley and Siegel—disputes about: the clarity, or
lack thereof, of the text; whether or not the text ought to be clear as a condition of the deployment of historical practice; whether the practice ought to
be written or not; what counts as the relevant practice; whether the practice
is settled; the level of generality; etc. Debates about historical practice arise
against the backdrop of contested and contestable normative visions about
our fundamental rules and fundamental values. If there was no contestation,
there would be no controversy.165
This is one reason that we do not think categorical definitions—conventions, liquidation, constitutional construction—are useful, descriptive,
prescriptive, or normative guides. What matters for gloss is contestation and
the plausible existence of historical practice. Whether gloss is deployed turns
on normative considerations. How gloss is deployed is dependent upon the
instrumental utility of the collateral methodological inquiries to achieving
the Court’s normative aim.
Chiafalo illustrates how these normative justifications cash out. The decision is not explained by the length, nature, or solidity of the historical
practice. It is explained by the normative justifications. Building on Bradley’s
work, we articulate, by way of illustration, two justifications that are relevant
to Chiafalo. One possibility is what Bradley calls Burkean consequentialism,
by which he means that courts might defer to “long-standing practices [that]
are suggestive of what works well.” As Bradley emphasizes, one important
worry here is the probability of unforeseen and unintended consequences. A
second possibility, which we call excavating fundamental rights, builds on
and expands what Bradley calls reliance interests. Recall here the plurality
opinion in Casey with respect to stare decisis. A practice may become suffi-

162

See id. at 64–69.
Issacharoff & Morrison, supra note 20, at 1917.
164
Id. at 1936.
165
This is another way of thinking about Tushnet’s distinction between thin and thick
Constitution. Within the thick Constitution are the things we do not fight about. Within the
thin Constitution reside the morass of our potential and actual disagreements.
163
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ciently long-standing and embedded in our society such that citizens have
come to rely upon it and view it as a fundamental constitutional right.
We see both of those justifications in Chiafalo. With respect to Burkean
consequentialism, if one listens to the oral argument in the case, the Justices
were very much concerned with the consequences of elector discretion. The
conservative Justices in particular were concerned about fraud, bribery, and
chaos—particularly chaos. For example, Justice Alito, speaking to Chiafalo’s
lawyer, Professor Lawrence Lessig, asked: “Those who disagree with your
argument say that it would lead to chaos, that in—where the election—
where the popular vote is close and changing it just a few votes would alter
the outcome or throw it into the House of Representatives, there would
be—the rational response within the losing political party or elements within
the losing political party would be to launch a massive campaign to try to
influence electors and there would be long period of uncertainty about who
the next president was going to be.”166 Here is Justice Kavanaugh. “I want to
follow up on Justice Alito’s line of questioning and what I might call the
avoid chaos principle of judging, which suggests that if it’s a close call or a
tiebreaker, that we shouldn’t facilitate or create chaos. And you, I think answered and said it hasn’t happened, but we have to look forward, and just
being realistic, judges are going to worry about chaos. So what do you want
to say about that?”167
To the chagrin of conservatives in the legal academy,168 all of the
Court’s conservative Justices, with the exception of Justice Thomas who concurred only in the majority’s judgment, joined Justice Kagan’s majority opinion and none, including Thomas, complained about her methodology. But
Burkean consequentialism might explain why some of the Court’s conservative Justices were willing to ignore what some conservative legal academics
regard as a clear text and an easy case for Chiafalo on originalism grounds.
From the perspective of the Court’s conservative Justices “fidelity to the
text,” risks corruption in the form of bribery and electoral chaos. What is to
gain? Textual purity? Faithfulness to an outdated vision? States have developed and are developing a process that seems to work—so why second-guess
them?
Perhaps more strongly, Chiafalo also illustrates the deployment of gloss
to excavate fundamental principles, such as whether voters have a right to
vote for President and Vice President. This might explain both why the liberal Justices used gloss here and why the majority identified the relevant
historical practice at its broadest level of generality. The majority in Chiafalo
picked a side in a clash over two competing understandings of representation
166
Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020)
(No. 19-465).
167
Id. at 33.
168
See, e.g., Mike Rappaport, The Originalist Disaster in Chiafalo, LAW & LIBERTY (Aug.
7, 2020), https://lawliberty.org/the-originalist-disaster-in-chiafalo/ [https://perma.cc/DG2528GM].
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and political participation. Chiafalo supports the modern conception of representation in which the people, broadly defined, are sovereign and bearer of
political rights. This is one of the reasons, we surmise, that Justice Kagan did
not rest her analysis on the Tenth Amendment, which makes the states sovereign. Her opinion seeks to vindicate political participation and political
equality among the electorate, unrestrained by the states. Under this modern
view, the people’s choices are determinative as a matter of political legitimacy. Electors are their agents, delegates who are only authorized to vote as
instructed by their principals.
This is the basis of appeals to the popular vote when results of the
Electoral College do not track the popular vote count. Notwithstanding the
fact that we do not elect our presidential directly through a national popular
vote, appeals to the popular vote count to impeach the electoral vote rest on
the argument that in choosing our rulers, we the people are sovereign, we get
to make those choices, and our revealed preferences ought to be determinative. As Justice Kagan said in Chiafalo, “here, We the People rule.”169
Justice Kagan’s opinion in Chiafalo anchors a jurisprudence in which a
right to vote and political participation can be established, even when that
right cannot be anchored in the text of the Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Kagan’s opinion gives some initial content to the right. Votes must be registered and counted. Voting is not an empty exercise. Voting is a mechanism
for conveying the preferences of the electorate. The expectations and practices of the demos can both establish the right and give content to it. Kagan
provides agency to the demos. The people are not limited to positive rights
of political participation established by the dead hand of the past. They can
create their own rights through their own democratic practices.
CONCLUSION
What are the implications of the Court’s decision in Chiafalo? Notwithstanding Chiafalo, so much of the way our presidential selection system operates remains entrenched in the Constitution and much also depends upon
practice or convention. To what extent can the presidential system be altered
by giving new meaning to the text through gloss instead of through the
Article V amendment process? Consider three particular questions, all of
which have been asked by Electoral College reformers.
First, do voters now have a constitutional right under the federal constitution to, indirectly but effectively, elect the President and Vice President?
Put differently, as a consequence of historical practice, are states constitutionally required to allow voters to vote for presidential electors? A longstanding reform proposal of the Electoral College calls for the direct popular
election of the President. This proposal dates back to the Founding, when

169

Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020).
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proponents relied on its apparent simplicity.170 Critics responded with arguments that resonate to this day. For example: it would be impractical; voters
lack information and would be easily deceived; and the large states would
have a larger influence than the smaller states.171 The critics won this first
battle, but reformers did not let up. Congress took up the question again in
1816 but failed to pass legislation on the matter.172 Reformers came very
close in 1970, when the Bayh-Celler Amendment passed in the House by
large margins and received President Nixon’s endorsement, only to succumb
to a Senate filibuster.173 Buoyed by public support,174 reformers have pressed
on through the years with no success. Constitutional obstacles have proven
insurmountable. Can voters now say that the Court’s approach in Chiafalo
provides them with a right to vote for President and Vice President?175
Second, reforms have also focused on how states choose to allocate their
Electoral College votes. Presently, most states assign all their votes on a winner-take-all basis.176 The states need not do so, however, and nothing in the
Constitution forbids them from assigning their votes differently. For example, states may choose to follow a districting system. Under this system,
states would distribute their votes by congressional district, with the two
remaining votes—one for each Senator— given to the winner of the statewide vote. States may also follow a proportional plan, which assigns their
Electoral College votes in proportion to the statewide vote. These plans date
back to the nineteenth century and continue to receive popular and scholarly
support today.177 But they are unable to overcome multiple obstacles. To be
170
See James Madison, Journal (July 25, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 25,
at 107, 111; James Madison, Journal (July 19, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note
25, at 50, 56–57; James Madison, Journal (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 25, at 25, 29–31.
171
See id. at 135, 137, 392, 454.
172
See NEAL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 161
(rev. ed. 1981).
173
See LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL
COLLEGE REFORM 174 (1972).
174
See Shepard, supra note 87.
175
We do not raise this question simply as an academic exercise. For example, politicians
in Arizona are proposing legislation that would authorize the State legislature to appoint the
State’s presidential electors after voters have voted. See GOP Bill Would Let Arizona Legislature
Revoke Presidential Election Results, KTAR NEWS, Jan. 29, 2021, https://ktar.com/story/
3949182/arizona-gop-bill-would-let-legislature-revoke-presidential-election-results/ [https://
perma.cc/9Q6Q-R2GN]. This proposal would seem to render the voters’ ballots purely
advisory.
176
See Jonah Engel Bromwich, How Does the Electoral College Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/how-does-the-electoral-collegework.html [https://perma.cc/635L-CUHA].
177
See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 173, at 132, 144; Ben Chapman, A Bipartisan
Approach to Electoral College Reform, MEDIUM (June 27, 2018), https://medium.com/
@Ben_Chapman/a-bipartisan-approach-to-electoral-college-reform-ab8c71d42442 [https://
perma.cc/AW59-ZFRG]; Edward B. Foley, An Idea for Electoral College Reform That Both
Parties Might Actually Like, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2019/01/12/electoral-college-reform-conservatives-223965 [https://perma.cc/ME2KZPKG].
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sure, Nebraska and Maine have adopted the districting method. However,
only once in their history—Nebraska in 2008—has one of these states split
the Electoral College vote. If more states begin to allocate their electoral
votes proportionally, will this serve as historical practice that will eventually
compel all of the states to allocate electoral votes proportionally?
Finally, consider the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact.178
Under the compact, states agree beforehand to distribute their Electoral
College votes to the candidate who wins the national popular vote. The
Compact will take effect once states that collectively reach 270 electoral
votes agree to bind themselves. Fifteen states plus the District of Columbia
have agreed to the compact, with electoral votes totaling 196. Notably, the
Compact does not require a constitutional amendment and, in fact, that is
precisely the point. The compact is a precommitment strategy.179 Once the
requisite states bind themselves, the Compact takes effect and avoids the
constitutional amendment process. This is because the Compact does not
change the Constitution at all, but the way that states choose to allocate
their electoral votes. How should the Court examine the Compact postChiafalo? Does the approach of Chiafalo improve the constitutional standing
of the Compact? Chief Justice Roberts anticipated this question at oral argument in Chiafalo and seemed to imply yes.
The Court’s decision in Chiafalo undermines a possible and critical
safety valve of our presidential selection process, by which a sufficient number of electors could disregard the wishes of the people if they believe that
the people have selected a demagogue to lead them. But the Court’s decision
in Chiafalo also provides more agency to the people. They are responsible for
their own political choices by crafting the types of democratic practices that
are consistent with their contemporary values. The Court’s decision in
Chiafalo makes the dead hand of the past, in the form of sticky textual commitments, less sticky and less controlling. It remains an open question
whether the Court’s attempt to reconcile text and practice is better or worse
for democracy. Are we better working with a system that is neither fish nor
fowl? Would we be better off facing the dictates of the text and the past
even if they lead to dire consequences, which would provide the impetus for
reforming our presidential selection system? How are we to deal with potential pathologies of our current system that cannot be glossed over. For example, what happens if the Electoral College continues to select with greater
frequency a candidate that loses the popular vote but wins the Electoral College vote? Does Chiafalo make it easier or harder to address this eventuality?
There certainly are limits to what courts and historical gloss can do to ad178
See Muller, supra note 88, at 1238; Vikram David Amar, How to—Carefully—Surmount the Electoral College, ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2020/01/national-popular-vote/604861/ [https://perma.cc/C2ZY-ENJE].
179
See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 37–47 (1979) (discussing precommitment strategies); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 195 (Jon
Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (applying the concept to constitutions).
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dress the gaps between practice and text. At some point, at least in the domain of the law of democracy, the people themselves must take up challenge
and entrench their settled agreements and watch the cycle begin anew for a
different generation that knew not Joseph.180

180

Exodus 1:8 (“Now there arose a new king over Egypt, who did not know Joseph.”)

